The Rhetoric of Parody in Plato’s Menexenus by Trivigno, Franco
Marquette University
e-Publications@Marquette
Philosophy Faculty Research and Publications Philosophy, Department of
1-1-2009
The Rhetoric of Parody in Plato’s Menexenus
Franco Trivigno
Marquette University, franco.trivigno@marquette.edu
Published version. Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2009): 29-58. DOI. © 2009 The
Pennsylvania State University Press. Used with Permission.
Philosophy and Rhetoric, Vol. 42, No. 1, 2009
Copyright © 2009 Th e Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA
 Th e Rhetoric of Parody in Plato’s 
 Menexenus 
 Franco V.  Trivigno 
 In Plato’s  Menexenus , Socrates spends nearly the entire dialogue reciting 
an  epitaphios logos , or funeral oration, that he claims was taught to him by 
Aspasia, Pericles’ mistress. Th ree diﬃ  culties confront the interpreter of this 
dialogue. First, commentators have puzzled over how to understand the 
 intention of Socrates’ funeral oration (see Clavaud 1980, 17–77). 1 Some insist 
that it is parodic, performing an essentially critical function (e.g., Loraux 
1986); while others claim that it is serious, in particular as an expression of 
Plato’s political ideal (e.g., Kahn 1963). 2 Adherents on both sides seem to 
think that the options are mutually exclusive. 3 Second, commentators have 
had diﬃ  culty understanding why Plato would have Socrates attribute his 
entire oration to Aspasia (e.g., Coventry 1989, 3; Pownall 2004, 60). Most 
agree that this move is ironic and that it has something to do with the alleged 
target of the dialogue’s criticism. But scholars have diﬀ ered over whether the 
Aspasia reference is meant to implicate Pericles’  funeral oration (Monoson 
1998), rhetoric in general (Pownall 2004),  Athens ( Loraux 1986), or even 
Aeschines (Clavaud 1980). 4 Th ird, scholars have struggled to make sense of 
the dialogue’s “deliberate and fantastic anachronism” (Dodds 1990, 24). In 
the funeral oration, Socrates relates the history of Athens up to the King’s 
Peace in 386 b.c., a full thirteen years after he has died. Th is problem has 
generated the least consensus, with some scholars restricting their  analysis 
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to dating considerations (e.g., Dodds 1990) and at least one  speculating that 
Socrates speaks in this dialogue as a ghost (Rosenstock 1994). 5 
 It is the contention of this article that, by understanding  the rhetoric of 
parody in the  Menexenus , one can resolve these diﬃ  culties and come to a 
coherent and uniﬁ ed understanding of the philosophical intentions of the 
dialogue. 6 More speciﬁ cally, I will show that the anachronism is a con-
sequence of a particular parodic strategy, that of ampliﬁ cation; that the 
dialogue’s parody targets not only Pericles’ funeral oration in particular but 
funeral oratory, rhetoric,  and Athens as well; and that the parody has serious 
philosophical implications. 7 Further, I claim that the serious philosophical 
content is both critical and constructive. Plato subverts the civic identity 
and understanding of virtue encouraged by the genre of funeral oration, 
and he challenges its praise-based model of political discourse. At the same 
time, Plato’s parodic criticism is not entirely negative, for it relies on alter-
native paradigms of civic identity, virtue, and political discourse. 
 i. the rhetoric of parody 
 Before turning to the  Menexenus itself, I want to clarify what I mean by 
 parody. For a working deﬁ nition, I suggest that parody is “an imitation that 
distorts a target text, author, or genre.” 8 In order to make some general 
 observations about the rhetoric of parody, I will look brieﬂ y at an exemplar 
of parody from Aristophanes’  Frogs . I do so for three reasons: to display two 
strategies of parodic distortion, to show that parody can have multiple targets, 
and to argue that parody can have both serious and complex intentions. 9 
 In the  Frogs (1331–63), Aristophanes uses at least two techniques of 
 parodic distortion,  inversion and  ampliﬁ cation , in his extended parody of 
Euripides’ monodies or single-actor odes. 10 Parodic inversion, broadly 
speaking, upsets or overturns the target text by distorting the original in a 
way that reverses the stylistic eﬀ ect or semantic intention. Parodic ampliﬁ -
cation hones in on one aspect of the target text and ampliﬁ es it to absurdity, 
often exposing its artiﬁ ciality as a literary trope. 
 Th e parodic scene features a woman who awakens, hysterical and terri-
ﬁ ed, from a god-sent dream, which has conveyed disturbing news. We ﬁ nd 
in this passage a particular kind of parodic inversion:  bathos , the unexpected 
introduction of the vulgar, ordinary, or mundane, which undermines an 
otherwise somber tone. 11 Consider the following excerpt: 
 Attendants, set alight a lamp for me, 
 Collect the dew of rivers in pitchers 
30
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 And heat the water, 
 So that I may wash away the god-sent dream. 
 Oh god of the sea, 
 It’s happened! Oh fellow dwellers, 
 Behold these portents! My rooster— 
 Snatched from me by Glyce long gone. ( Frogs 1338–45) 12 
 Th e parody accesses its target by mimicking several linguistic features 
 typical of tragic lyric (poetic diction, suppression of articles, etc.), thereby 
reproducing a tragic tone. 13 Th is tone is then undermined by bathos: the 
protagonist’s terrifying prophetic dream turns out to be about nothing more 
than a lost chicken. Th e parody targets features of tragic lyric that are not 
necessarily peculiar to Euripides, though he is obviously the target as well. 
In other words, the parody targets both Euripides  and tragedy as such. 
 Parody’s distortion also works by amplifying an idiom or trope to 
 absurdity. Th e parodic passage targets the hysterical or frenzied repetition 
of words typical of Euripidean monody. 14 Notice the multiple repetitions 
accumulated in ﬁ ve lines of the Aristophanic parody: 
 He soared soared [ a)ne/ptat' a)ne/ptat' ] into the ether 
 On the lightest tips of his wings, 
 Leaving pain pain [ aÃxe' aÃxea ] for me 
 And tears tears [ da/krua da/krua ] from my eyes 
 I shed shed [ eÃbalon eÃbalon ], feeling wretched. ( Frogs 1351–55) 
 Th e repetitions occur in a way that is recognizably Euripidean but in such 
close proximity as to make them seem artiﬁ cial. Th e overaccumulation of 
frantic repetition undermines its rhetorical intent because the repetition 
occurs too frequently, and the degree to which it is a contrived literary trope 
is exposed. 
 Aristophanes’  Frogs serves as an object lesson with respect to the 
 serious and complex intentions of parody. 15 Parody expresses a kind of criti-
cism, and while this criticism could be tongue in cheek, it might also have 
a serious purpose. Hence, it would be a mistake to insist that no parody 
has serious intentions. 16 Th e parody of Euripides deals with a serious, that 
is, important, issue, the relation between the decline of tragedy and the 
decline of Athenian prominence (Henderson 2002, 5). Dionysus, the main 
character, descends into Hades, where Euripides and Aeschylus compete 
to become the savior of Athens. In addition to this serious context, the 
parody  exempliﬁ es a serious and particular criticism of Euripides’  poetry. 
the rhetoric of parody in plato’s menexenus
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In order to understand the parody, we need to locate the determinate 
axis of  criticism, that is, the  wherein or  with respect to what the parodying 
text is critical. 17 In the ﬁ rst quotation above, the parodic criticism is that 
 Euripides’ tragedy is too concerned with the everyday. 18 By dramatizing an 
ordinary situation in a high tragic manner, the parody absurdly exempliﬁ es 
 Euripides’  earlier claim—a boast really—that his tragedies are concerned 
with everyday  matters,  oi)kei=a pra/gmata ( Frogs 959). Th is criticism of 
 Euripides as too mundane or ordinary is conﬁ rmed at the end of the  Frogs 
when he is  accused of “stripping the tragic art of its greatness” (1495–96). 19 
Th e  criticism does not stand alone, however; it rather depends on a certain 
paradigm or ideal of tragedy. 
 To see this, we need to turn to the  complex intentions of parody, that 
is, the way that parody can be  both critical and constructive. 20 Parody can 
criticize while at the same time pointing beyond itself to an implied ideal, 
which the parodied text fails to live up to. Th e  Frogs is incoherent without 
the assumption that tragedy has a privileged didactic role to play in the 
city. 21 Th e question that drives the action is whether Euripides or  Aeschylus 
better fulﬁ lls the tragedian’s role as educator or, put diﬀ erently, which trage-
dian remains true to the tragic ideal as Aristophanic comedy conceives of it. 
If this is right, then based on the parodic criticism of Euripides, we might 
conclude that the Aristophanic ideal of tragedy includes the portrayal of 
great, exemplary ﬁ gures. One way that tragedy performs its educational 
function is by staging characters “better than ourselves,” as Aristotle puts it 
( Poet. 1448a16–18), as paradigms or exemplars. 22 But by staging an ordinary 
situation with an ordinary character, so the parodic criticism goes, this is 
just what Euripides fails to do. 
 Armed with this understanding of the possibilities of the rhetoric 
of parody, that is, its techniques, its multiple targets, and its serious and 
 complex intentions, I now turn to the  Menexenus . 
 ii. ironic praise and comedy in the opening scene 
 In the opening scene of the  Menexenus , Plato prepares us for the parody by 
introducing its multiple targets through ironic praise and by establishing a 
comic tone. First, on hearing that Menexenus is coming from the Council 
Chamber, Socrates teases him by suggesting that the young man is “ﬁ nished 
with education and philosophy” and ready to turn to the “higher pursuit” of 
holding political oﬃ  ce in Athens (234a4–7). Socrates’ praise of participation 
in Athenian politics is clearly ironic here, as there is arguably never a time 
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when one is done with philosophy and no sense in which holding public 
oﬃ  ce in Athens constitutes a higher pursuit than philosophy. 
 When Menexenus clariﬁ es that he has only been to the Council 
 Chamber to hear the choice of speaker for the upcoming funeral oration, 
Socrates launches into a speech ironically extolling the virtues of funeral 
oratory. Socrates lauds death in war as especially fortunate, since one gets 
an expensive funeral and lavish praise from an expert orator, even if one was 
not particularly distinguished in battle. Not only are all the dead praised, 
but the audience is typically praised as well. 23 As Socrates puts it, the  funeral 
orator “cast[s] a spell over . . . the souls” of the audience by praising the city, 
the war dead, the city’s ancestors, and the living citizens; under this spell, 
Socrates claims to feel “taller and nobler and more beautiful all of a sud-
den,” and he imagines that Athens is the Islands of the Blessed; only after 
several days does this bewitching eﬀ ect wear oﬀ  (234c–235c). 24 
 Menexenus immediately recognizes Socrates’ praise as ironic and 
accuses him of implicitly mocking and criticizing the orators in general 
(235c6). He worries that the speaker they choose will have insuﬃ  cient 
time to compose the speech. Mentioning the short time between selec-
tion and speech was one of the commonplaces of the funeral oration. 
Here, Socrates’ criticism becomes explicit. He asserts that  epitaphioi are 
all prepared ahead of time, strongly implying that they are formulaic. In 
addition, he claims that they are destined to succeed, since “when one 
performs in front of the very people one is praising, it is no great accom-
plishment to seem to speak well” (235d5–6). 25 Th is ironic praise of funeral 
oratory and rhetoric  anticipates some of the substance of the parodic criti-
cism to follow. 
 Socrates praises Aspasia as his formidable rhetoric teacher and Peri-
cles, “the one exceptional orator among the Greeks,” as her best student 
(235e6–7). Aspasia was Pericles’ mistress and a favorite target of the comedi-
ans (Henry 1995, 19–28). 26 Socrates credits his epitaphios to her: she recited 
it “in part extemporaneously, in part by cobbling together [ sugkollw=sa ] 
some remnants from when she was composing the funeral oration  Pericles 
delivered” (236b3–6). 27 By claiming the much-maligned Aspasia as his 
rhetoric teacher and attributing a funeral oration to her, he implicitly 
denigrates both rhetoric and funeral oratory. 28 Further, by insisting on 
attributing to her both Pericles’ rhetorical education and his funeral ora-
tion, Socrates makes clear that Pericles’ funeral oration is also one of his 
targets. 29 Even Menexenus understands Socrates’ irony in attributing the 
speech to  Aspasia (236c5–7). 30 
33
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 Socrates’ ironic claim that even someone less well educated than  himself 
could succeed in praising Athenians in front of Athenians seems to indicate 
that the parody targets the Periclean funeral oration as Th ucydides presented 
it. He cites the example of “a man who was taught music by Lamprus and 
oratory by Antiphon the Rhamnusian” (236a). Th is is  arguably a reference 
to Th ucydides. Marcellinus, impressed with Th ucydides’ praise of Antiphon 
and their similar prose style, had speculated that Antiphon was Th ucydides’ 
teacher ( Vit. Th uc. 22). 31 In addition, Socrates uses Th ucydidean language 
in the prologue: he twice refers to the Spartans as “Peloponnesians” (235d3, 
235d4), a term that Th ucydides uses frequently and Plato, almost never. In 
other dialogues, Plato uses “Lacadaimonians” almost exclusively. 32 
 In addition to these ironic hints as to the target of the parody, Plato 
 includes some  topoi from Old Comedy, which signal that the funeral speech 
is parodic. Socrates plays the comic ﬁ gure of the late learner, whose old 
age and attendant forgetfulness make his enrollment in school ridiculous. 33 
He hesitates to give the speech because he is afraid that Menexenus will 
laugh at him since, though he is such an old man, he will be playing with 
epitaphios. In addition, Socrates portrays Aspasia as a tyrant, who nearly 
beat him for not remembering her speech well enough, and he fears that 
she will be very angry with him for revealing it. Socrates ﬁ nally commits to 
performing the speech  for Menexenus, whom he so greatly wishes to gratify 
that he would willingly strip and dance for him (236c11–d2). Th is declara-
tion recalls the practice of the chorus in Old Comedy, which always cast oﬀ  
their cloaks before dancing and sometimes announced that they were doing 
so. 34 Th e playfulness of the opening scene prepares us for the parody—but, 
as many commentators have noticed, the playful tone of the prologue does 
not carry over into the epitaphios itself (e.g., Kennedy 1963, 159). 35 
 iii. plato’s parody of pericles 
 Socrates’ speech contains all of the conventional elements of the  epitaphios: 
a prelude ( prooemium ) identifying the speech as required by law, praise 
( epainos ) of the dead and of the city’s past glory, a consoling  exhortation 
( paramythia ) to the relatives of the dead, and an epilogue concluding 
the speech and dismissing the audience (Ziolkowski 1981). 36 However, 
there are also more particular reminiscences of the Periclean oration 
(Gomme 1956; Henderson 1975; Kahn 1963; Monoson 1998). 37 Th ough the 
two speeches are bound by the same conventions, in two instances Plato 
seems clearly to be parodying Pericles (Kahn 1963, 222). 38 
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 Th e prelude typically consisted of a reference to the  nomos  prescribing 
the speech, reﬂ ection on the proper kind of  logos , and some preliminary 
praise, which marked a transition to the next section (Ziolkowski 1981, 
58–73). Th e  logos – ergon antithesis was a commonplace in the prelude to 
 denote the diﬃ  culty of ﬁ nding the words to do justice to the brave deeds of 
the fallen (Ziolkowski 1981, 68–70). Both Pericles and Socrates begin their 
speeches with a more elaborate version of this antithesis: 
 Many of those [ oi( me\n polloi \] who have spoken here in the past 
have praised the man who set down the custom [ t%= no/m% ] of this 
speech [ to\n lo/gon to/nde ], deeming it good that it should be deliv-
ered at the burial of those who fall in battle. For my part [ e)moi\ de \], 
it seems that the worth that had displayed itself in deeds [ eãrg% ] 
should be suﬃ  ciently rewarded by honors also shown by deeds 
[ eãrg% ], such as you now see in this funeral prepared at the people’s 
cost, and not have the valor [ a)reta\j ] of many men imperiled by 
one man, to stand or fall according to whether he spoke well or 
poorly. (Th uc. 2.35.1) 
 As for deeds [ eãrg% me\n ], these man have received their due from 
us, and with it they travel on their destined path,  accompanied 
communally by the city and privately by their families. As for 
words [ lo/g% me\n ], the remaining honor, which the custom 
[ no/moj ]  assigns for these men and duty demands, must be  bestowed. 
When deeds [ eãrgwn ] have been bravely done, it is through 
 beautifully spoken words [ lo/g% ] that commemo ration and honor 
accrue for the doers from the audience. What is required, then, 
is a speech [ lo/gou ] that suﬃ  ciently praises those who have died. 
( Mx. 236d7–e1) 
 Kahn persuasively argues that the respective antitheses are too particular 
to be coincidental: “In both cases the  logos in question is, of course, the 
funeral oration; and in both cases, the contrasting eãrg% is used twice: ﬁ rst 
for the ceremonious act of public burial and, secondly, for the brave deeds of 
the dead warriors” (1963, 222). 39 No other oration contains such an elaborate 
antithesis, and no other refers to the act of burial as one of the “deeds” to be 
contrasted with the funeral speech. 40 
 Th ough he uses the same terms ( logos, ergon, nomos ) and syntactical 
construction (antithesis) as Pericles in order to introduce his task, Socrates 
makes the opposite point. Whereas Pericles laments the necessity of words 
35
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in order to make deeds praiseworthy and regrets the custom that makes his 
speech necessary at all, Socrates emphatically endorses the custom and the 
necessity of beautiful words. 41 Socrates reminds one of Pericles’ antithesis 
but inverts or overturns the meaning. Th is inversion operates on two levels 
because both Pericles and Socrates are (to some degree) dissembling: we 
might call Pericles’ rhetorical ﬁ gure a kind of false modesty, an aﬀ ected or 
feigned self-deprecation. In overtly denying the wisdom of the tradition 
and the importance of his role as executor, Pericles actually means to aﬃ  rm 
it, and by not doing what everyone else does, he draws attention to himself 
as a unique speaker. Socrates turns this ﬁ gure on its head—in ironically 
praising the custom and exalting himself as its executor, he actually under-
mines both the speech’s and the speaker’s importance. 
 Th us, Socrates implicitly challenges the tradition and announces a 
“ polemical relationship” with Pericles (Kahn 1963, 222). 42 He implies that the 
beautiful but  false words are necessary, since the truth would be ill suited to 
the event’s purpose: as Socrates points out earlier, not all of the deeds were 
brave or praiseworthy (234c2–6). Th e words will not match but, rather, exceed 
the deeds, though the tradition has it the other way around. Th e implicit ideal is 
that words should be appropriate to deeds: beautiful words should be reserved 
for truly admirable deeds. Pericles and other funeral orators praise the deeds 
of the war dead with beautiful words whether they deserve it or not. 
 In the praise section of the epitaphios, it was common to praise the 
constitution, or  politei/a , of Athens (Ziolkowski 1981, 89–91, 95). 43 Th e 
speech’s second clear parallel to Pericles’ oration comes in Socrates’ manner 
of praising the city’s democratic constitution: 
 In name, [our constitution] is called a democracy [ dhmokrati¯a 
ke/klhtai ], because we govern not for the few but for the many; 
whereas equality in the eyes of the law exists for all in their 
 private disputes, with respect to social standing [ kata\ de\ th\n 
a)ci/wsin ], each  person is honored with public oﬃ  ce for his good 
 reputation [ eãn t% eu)dokimei =]—not by class but rather by virtue 
[ a)p' a)reth=j ]—and nor again if he is poor but capable of doing 
some good for the city will he be prevented on account of insuf-
ﬁ cient public esteem. (Th uc. 2.37.1–2) 
 Th ough one man calls [ kalei= ] our constitution a democracy 
[ dhmokrati/an ], and another, whatever pleases him, in truth, it is an 
aristocracy with the people’s approval. We have always had kings. 
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At one time, they were by birth; at another time, they were elected. 
But for the most part, the people possess power over the city, and 
they grant government oﬃ  ces and powers to those who at any 
given time seem to be the best [ toi=j a)ei\ do/casin a)ri/stoij  eiÅnai ]. 
No one is excluded because of poverty or weakness or  obscure 
parentage—nor is anyone honored because of the  opposites, as in 
other cities—but there is one standard: the one who seems wise 
or good [ o( do/caj sofo\j hÄ a)gaqo\j eiÅnai ] has power and governs. 
( Mx. 238c7–d8) 
 Both emphasize that the leaders are chosen based on their reputation for 
virtue. What Pericles implies, that the constitution is not  really a democ-
racy, Socrates comes right out and says by calling it an aristocracy. 44 When 
Th ucydides describes the state of Athens during Pericles’ heyday, he claims 
that it was  in practice not a democracy: “While in speech the city was a 
democracy, in fact, it was ruled by a ﬁ rst citizen” (2.65.10). 
 In his praise of the Athenian constitution, Socrates ampliﬁ es the 
 necessity of  seeming or  appearing wise in order to rule in the city. Th e 
 necessity of appearing is implicit in the Periclean formulation: the second 
antithesis concerns the evaluation, the deeming worthy, which is granted 
according to reputation or esteem ( t% eu)dokimei =). When describing the 
public choice or preference, the reference to reputation, the implication of 
seeming, falls away, and the choice is described as being made according to 
virtue ( a)p' a)reth=j ). For Pericles, the implication is that seeming virtuous 
is, or must be, an indication of virtue. Socrates exposes this not only by 
leaving the implication of seeming intact in his reformulation but by mak-
ing it so explicit as to give pause. 45 Th e “heaviness” of the two clauses,  toi=j 
a)ei\ do/casin a)ri/stoij eiÅnai and  o( do/caj sofo\j hÄ a)gaqo\j eiÅnai , focuses 
our attention on the importance of seeming. Th rough this ampliﬁ cation, 
Socrates suggests that seeming wise—having a reputation for wisdom—is 
not a suﬃ  cient condition of being wise. 
 Th e implication of the parody is that, in a democracy, one never gets 
outside of the appearance of virtue to the reality of the matter. Th us, Socrates 
undermines the supposedly meritocratic basis of democratic political power. 
Socrates’ parodic criticism targets Pericles both as speaker, by undermining 
his assertion, and as leader of Athens, by undermining his claim to be virtu-
ous and thus deserving of rule. 46 Ideally, of course, the best, or the virtuous, 
should rule. Th at they do not in Athens is not an incidental feature of the 
democracy. Rather, it follows from democracy’s emphasis on appearances 
37
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and the attendant importance of rhetoric that the most persuasive speaker 
will rule instead. 47 
 iv. the distortion of athenian history in the 
funeral oration 
 Th e praise section typically contained a historical part, which celebrated 
the noble deeds of the ancestors of the dead (Ziolkowski 1981, 90, 95–97). 
 After giving an account of the city’s autochthonous origin, Socrates uses 
the  Persian War as a paradigm to paint a portrait of Athens—in line 
with the tradition of funeral oratory—as a philanthropic city that ﬁ ghts 
for the freedom of the Greeks against barbarian aggression. 48 Th e genre 
 requires the history to reﬂ ect Athenian moral and military superiority. To 
achieve this, Socrates’ funeral oration incorporates numerous historical 
inaccuracies. 49 However, since fourth-century orators and funeral speak-
ers in  particular regularly misrepresented Athenian history (Pearson 1941; 
Perlman 1961; Pownall 2004, 38–40; Samons 2000, 96; Worthington 1994), 
often for the greater glory of Athens, we cannot conclude from the mere 
presence of historical inaccuracies, or of any particular inaccuracy, that 
Socrates’ speech contains  parodic distortion. 50 Th e parodic distortion lies 
rather in the  accumulation of such inaccuracies that render the history it 
presents both self-contradictory in places and on the whole unbelievable. 51 
Th us, Socrates adopts the logic of patriotic, revisionist history and ampli-
ﬁ es the revisions to absurdity. 52 In this way, Plato exposes the deceptive and 
self- aggrandizing character of the history section as a whole. I will focus my 
analysis on three distortions: ﬁ rst, Socrates omits mention of Athens’ ﬁ fth-
century  empire; second, he claims that Athens has never been defeated; last, 
he insists that Athens is always hostile to Persia. 
 To sanitize the character of Athens’ ﬁ fth-century empire, or to  ignore 
it altogether, was common in fourth-century oratory (Chambers 1975; 
Pownall 2004, 41–43). To maintain Athens’ moral superiority, Socrates’ 
speech sacriﬁ ces a signiﬁ cant achievement of Athens’ military superiority, 
her empire. To acknowledge that Athens was an empire would confound 
the Persian War model, by casting the heroic liberators as enslavers. 53 On 
Socrates’ account, Athens only ﬁ ghts just, defensive wars. Battles from the 
ﬁ fth century seeming to relate to the establishment, expansion, and defense 
of Athens’ empire are all interpreted as either strictly defensive or aim-
ing at the liberation of an oppressed city. On Socrates’ account, the initial 
hostilities with the Spartans resulted from Athens’ desire to ﬁ ght “for the 
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freedom of the Boeotians” (242a7), as the Athenians took up their new role 
of “ﬁ ghting for the freedom of Greeks against other Greeks” (242b5–6); 
the Archidamian War (the ﬁ rst half of the Peloponnesian War) was fought 
because “all the Greeks attacked” Athens (242c3–5); the Sicilian expedition 
was undertaken in order to achieve the “freedom of the people of Leontini” 
(243a1–2). Th ese descriptions are clearly self-serving, not to mention self-
aggrandizing, accounts of the origins of each of the conﬂ icts. 54 It is argu-
ably the case that these battles resulted from Athens’ aggressive imperialist 
policy, as advocated by Pericles (Th uc. 2.36) and later leaders like Alcibiades 
(Th uc. 6.16–18). 55 Socrates’ silence on the topic of empire contrasts most 
strongly with Pericles’ emphatic assertion that the expansion of the empire 
measures the achievement of a generation (Th uc. 2.36.1–3). 56 By remaining 
silent on the ﬁ fth-century empire, Socrates’ speech challenges Pericles’ ideal 
of an expansive empire and, with that, the need for wars of aggression. 
 Th e Athenian funeral oration, to be sure, emphasized Athenian supe-
riority in warfare and cited its numerous victories, the Persian War most 
prominently (Ziolkowski 1981, 121–29). Th ough other orators at least concede 
Athens’ defeats, even if they understandably do not dwell on them, Socrates 
insists that Athens “remains undefeated to this day” (243d5–6). 57 He claims 
that the people who thought that the city could never be  defeated were 
 right to believe it! Socrates qualiﬁ es this statement by  clarifying that Athens 
was never defeated  by others —she only defeated herself. Th ough his account 
forces Socrates to insist that every single defeat was an instance of self-
defeat, he refuses to criticize the Athenians for their quarrels and disunity. 58 
By contrast, he is at pains to emphasize their “kinship” and “steady friend-
ship” (244a2)—even in the bitter civil war of 403 b.c. —and their avoidance 
of “malice” and “hatred” (244a7). Socrates claims also that, through bravery, 
Athens won not only the naval battle at Arginusae but also “the rest of the 
[Peloponnesian] war as well” (243d2)! Since military and moral inferiority are 
ruled out, any failure is due to “bad luck” (244b1), and Socrates uses ambigu-
ous and distancing language to describe such occurrences. 59 By  pausing to 
dwell on the question of defeat and taking such circumlocutory pains to 
avoid its admission, Socrates undermines his attempt to gloss over it. 60 
 Socrates’ insistence that the Athenians remain resolutely hostile to 
the Persians falls into obvious contradiction when imposed on the Corin-
thian conﬂ ict. Indeed, Socrates draws attention to the inconsistency by 
 ratcheting up the anti-Persian rhetoric: he claims that the Athenians “by 
nature hate the barbarians” (245c7–d1), “are purely Greek, not mixed with 
barbarians” (245d1–2), and have an “uncompromising hatred of foreign 
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 origin” (245d5–6). Socrates declares that, though against fellow Greeks “it is 
right to ﬁ ght until victory,” against the barbarians “it is right to ﬁ ght until 
destruction” (242d1–4). Th e Persian king is described as the “worst enemy” 
of all the Greeks (243b). Other Greek cities are excoriated for conspiring 
with the Persians, as though this were a severe moral failing (243b, 244b–c). 
In response to such commiseration, the indignant Athenians adopted a 
policy of “no longer protecting the Greeks from being enslaved” (244c3–5). 
When the Spartans began to enslave Greeks and Persians alike, Socrates 
claims, “even the King was in such diﬃ  culties that his liberation came from 
none other than that city which he had been so eager to destroy” (244d5–e1). 
Socrates immediately oﬀ ers an excuse for helping Persia followed by a dis-
ingenuous qualiﬁ cation. For helping the Persians, Athens can be “justly 
charged” with being “always excessively prone to pity and attentive to the 
weak” (244e1–3). She could not bear to assist the king in person, so she 
“released the Greeks from slavery herself ” but let “exiles and mercenaries” 
help the Persians (245a1–7). Th e speciousness of this qualiﬁ cation becomes 
apparent when Socrates insists that Athens “saved” the king (245a7) and 
praises “those who released the king” as brave (246a1). Th ese latter must 
be Athenians, since the praise comes in the context of the bravery of the 
Athenians lost in the Corinthian conﬂ ict. 
 One might want to object here that the history that Socrates pres-
ents does not  really amplify—or amplify enough—the level of historical 
inaccuracy typical of fourth-century orators to justify calling it parody. Th e 
dialogue’s “deliberate and fantastic” anachronism, which becomes clear in 
the history section, I suggest, caps the parodic strategy of ampliﬁ cation to 
absurdity and ensures the parodic intentions of Socrates’ account. Th ough 
anachronism is not unknown in Plato, the anachronism in the  Menexenus 
is unique, not only because the dramatic date is so obviously impossible but 
also because Socrates explicitly calls attention to it. He begins by implying 
that he will not dwell on the Corinthian conﬂ ict since it is contemporary 
(244d1–3) but then proceeds to give a long and detailed account of it. By 
dramatically pausing at the moment he begins the contemporary part of 
his history, he calls attention to himself as speaker and the essential unreli-
ability of his account. Further, it seems very unlikely that, given the nature 
of his trial and execution and indeed what he says about the Athenians in 
 Apology and elsewhere, Socrates would actually endorse  as true his glowing 
portrait of Athens and Athenian history. Th us, like the circumlocutions and 
inconsistencies, the anachronism draws our attention to the dubious nature 
of the history that the oration presents. 61 
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 Socrates, in presenting a contradictory history, and indeed a history 
that it is a contradiction for him to have given, goes beyond the  acceptable 
level of revisionist history expected of the genre. Th e parody makes two 
main points about the funeral oration’s historical inaccuracies. First, by 
following the epitaphios’s logic of praise to absurdity, Socrates exposes its 
utter lack of concern for truth. Th e bewitching feeling of self-satisfaction, 
which Socrates describes in the opening, depends on deception. By  making 
the audience feel good when being deceived, the funeral oration fosters 
an indiﬀ erence to truth. Good political rhetoric, by contrast, would foster 
a desire for the truth. Second, by revealing the distance between a praise-
worthy Athenian history and the actual Athenian history, Socrates’ parody 
rejects Athens’ imperial past while at the same time encouraging a peaceful, 
or at least nonaggressive, future. 
 v. the exhortation to virtue in the speech 
of the dead 
 A regular feature of the epitaphios was the exhortation section, which 
 typically contained both consolation and advice (Ziolkowski 1981, 138–63, 
esp. 138–40). Th ose who argue that the funeral oration is meant seriously or 
nonparodically typically point to this section (246d–249c), the bulk of which 
consists of a speech that Socrates delivers about virtue on behalf of the dead 
(246d–248d). Th ey do so based on two considerations: ﬁ rst, the exhorta-
tion to virtue looks like a Socratic exhortation (Kahn 1963); 62  second, there 
is a noticeable shift in tone at the beginning of the exhortation section 
( Collins and Stauﬀ er 1999, 91, 104–9; Henderson 1975, 45; Monoson 1998, 
502; Rosenstock 1994, 340; Salkever 1993, 140). 63 Neither consideration is 
decisive: commentators have not fully appreciated, ﬁ rst, that the exhorta-
tion was a regular feature of the genre and, second, that a shift in tone is just 
what one would expect when moving from celebration and praise to con-
solation and exhortation. 64 On my view, the speech of the dead continues 
the parody through its subtle inversion of the impoverished and militaristic 
conception of virtue, or  aretē , typical of the funeral oration. 65 
 It would hardly be an exaggeration to claim that virtue is a central 
theme of epitaphios. 66 Th e funeral oration sets up a paradigm or model 
of virtue for the citizens. In the Socratic parody,  aretē , as in other funeral 
orations, primarily means “courage” or “valor.” Th is is unsurprising in a 
speech that praises the war dead. In the beginning of the oration, Socrates 
claims that the two requirements of an epitaphios are to praise the dead 
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as they deserve and to admonish the living by urging them to imitate the 
aretē of the dead (236e3–6). Th roughout the epitaphios,  aretē simply means 
“ courage.” During the speech of the dead, however, a paradigm shift occurs 
in the understanding of  aretē that is subtle but signiﬁ cant. 
 Socrates ends the praise section, recalling his own elenchic practice as 
described in the  Apology 29d–30b, by encouraging the sons of the dead to 
be brave and claiming that “whenever I happen to meet any one of you, 
I will remind and exhort you [ parakeleu/esqai ] to strive to be as good as 
possible [ w(j a)ri/stouj ]” (246b7–c2). Socrates claims that he will repeat the 
words of the dead that he “heard from them and what . . . they would gladly 
say to [the living] now, if they were able” (246c4–5). Th e speech exhorts 
three distinct groups: the sons of the dead (246d–247c), the parents of the 
dead (247c–248d), and, very brieﬂ y, the city (248d). 67 
 Th e ﬁ rst injunction to the sons is to act always “with aretē, know-
ing that, without it, all possessions and ways of life are shameful and bad” 
(246e1–2). Up until this point,  aretē has been used to indicate bravery, that 
is, virtue in warfare, exclusively. Given the reference to “ways of life” in this 
instance, however, a wider conception of  aretē is clearly in play. Th is read-
ing is conﬁ rmed by the very next instance: “All knowledge cut oﬀ  from 
justice and the rest of virtue [ th=j aãllhj a)reth=j ] looks like cunning, not 
wisdom” (246e7–247a2). Th is claim has been taken as an “allusion” to the 
unity of the virtues (Kahn 1963, 229), but such an interpretation goes too 
far. While the speech surely does endorse the unity of virtue in some sense, 
it certainly does not do so in a genuinely Socratic way. Th is is conﬁ rmed by 
the rest of the exhortation to the children, which is concerned with honor, 
possessions, and public esteem; in fact, it reverts to the militaristic notion 
of virtue by conceiving it in terms of victory and defeat, glory and shame 
(247a–c). 
 In the exhortation to the parents, Socrates mentions, indeed  features, 
the Delphic injunction to moderation:  mhde\n aÃgan , or nothing in  excess 
(247e5). Once virtue ceases to be understood as identical to  military 
 prowess, Socrates begins referring to the particular virtues (as opposed 
to virtue as such), including  a)ndrei=oj , the  vox propria for courage, which 
occurs only in the exhortation to the parents (247d7, 247d8, 248a4). Again, 
some  commentators have seen this endorsement of moderation as genu-
inely Socratic (e.g., Kahn 1963, 229). Th is is hardly so, as the moderation 
encouraged primarily concerns the level of grief that the parents will allow 
themselves to publicly express (248b–c). To be sure, such a sentiment looks 
like the injunction against public expressions of grief in the  Republic , but, 
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by itself, it much more resembles the commonplace in the epitaphios of 
acknowledging parental grief while at the same time denying its necessity 
and enjoining the parents to moderate their expression of it (Ziolkowski 
1981, 151–53). 68 Further, Socrates talks as though moderation  amounts to its 
public face: “If [the fathers] give in to grief, they will elicit the  suspicion that 
either they are not really the fathers [of the dead] or the people who praise 
[the dead] are wrong” (247e1–2). Th e emphasis here is on how one appears 
and not, as one would expect from a genuinely Socratic account, on the 
state of one’s soul. 69 
 Th e parodic criticism reveals the understanding of virtue  encouraged by 
epitaphios to be overly narrow and indeed at the expense of the other virtues. 
In showing this, he both reveals a limitation of the  epitaphios’s  conception 
of virtue and points to a richer ideal of virtue. While it is not  inappropriate 
for a funeral oration to celebrate bravery in battle, the  epitaphios inap-
propriately construes virtue as equivalent to military  prowess. It restricts a 
citizen’s understanding of his duties to his military duties and so circum-
scribes the measure of his ﬁ tness or goodness as a person. For example, 
according to Pericles, bravery in battle  cancels out other vices (Th uc. 2.42). 70 
Th is myopic understanding of virtue goes hand in hand with an aggressive 
military  program and expansionist policies like those advocated by Pericles 
and other leaders. 71 If being good implies being a successful warrior, then 
the city has an obligation to look for wars in order to give its citizens an 
opportunity to demonstrate their worth. But this would preclude the pur-
suit of intellectual and more particularly philosophical goals. Further, such 
a narrow conception aﬀ ects other virtues as well, by limiting their scope and 
relevance. Virtue is indeed uniﬁ ed on this conception, but we need modera-
tion, it seems, only when a soldier has bravely died. Th e critique does not 
itself substantially ﬁ ll out the thicker notion of virtue, but it does expose the 
inadequacy and attendant dangers of the  narrow version. 72 
 If this analysis is right, then Plato exploits the  superﬁ cial similarity 
between Socratic exhortation and funeral oratory’s in order to expose the 
latter as a poor version of the former. Th ough the ideas in the exhorta-
tion are not themselves genuinely Socratic, the parody points toward 
a Socratic conception of virtue. While Socrates’ exhortation genuinely 
attempts to turn its audience toward a philosophically grounded concep-
tion of  virtue—indeed, the discovery of the philosophical ground is often 
the entire point— epitaphios halfheartedly attempts to inculcate an already 
given war-oriented demotic virtue. Th e force of this point is perhaps 
clouded by taking the passage in isolation from the rest of the speech. 73 
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Notice that everything  preceding the exhortation encourages the audience 
to think that they  already are virtuous , and so the attempt to convince them 
to pursue virtue at this point in the epitaphios could hardly be expected to 
 succeed. By contrast, genuinely Socratic protreptic operates via criticism, 
not praise. 74 Further, while Socrates typically exhorts his interlocutors to 
pursue an inquiry into the nature of virtue, the epitaphios presents a deter-
minate conception of virtue for its audience to pursue. But to understand 
the point of the  parody is to see the inadequacies of the martial conception 
of virtue and, ideally, to be moved to investigate the true nature of virtue. 
Th is is the essence of Socratic protreptic, if anything is. 75 
 vi. care, war, and the role of the city 
 Socrates ends the speech of the dead with a brief exhortation to the city to 
care for the living: “We  would exhort the city to care for [ e)pimelh/ sontai ] 
our parents and children, educating the latter decently and cherishing the 
former in their old age as they deserve, but we  already know that she will care 
for [ e)pimelh/setai ] them suﬃ  ciently without our exhortation” (248d2–6). 
In describing what the city actually does, Socrates claims, “For those who 
have died, she stands as an inheritor and a son, for their sons, as a father, 
for their parents, as a guardian; she takes complete care [ e)pime/leian ] of all 
of them for all time” (249b7–c3). Some scholars have taken this passage as a 
serious, nonparodic expression of Plato’s political ideal in terms of care and, 
recalling the  Republic , family relationships (most notably, Monoson 1998). 76 
Th is interpretation fails to adequately appreciate, ﬁ rst, that Socrates praises 
Athens for  already accomplishing such care and, second, that the model of 
care is articulated in primarily military terms and takes no account of the 
education of the soul. On my view, this passage completes the parody of the 
tendency of epitaphios to idealize the actual city, with an emphasis on its 
relationship to its citizen-soldiers. 
 Socrates’ insistence that Athens  already provides adequate care to its citi-
zens provides a strong presumption in favor of parodic intentions. While earlier 
praise of Athens focused on her military achievements, here the parody focuses 
on the city’s relation to its citizens. In enumerating the components of state 
care, Socrates makes clear that the city’s concern kicks in  only after someone 
has died in battle (248e). Th ere are three basic elements of this state care, which 
do not, it seems to me, add up to a legitimately Platonic conception of care. 
 First, Socrates claims that the parents of the dead are protected from 
injustice by the highest magistrate  more than  (diafero/ntwj ) the other 
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 citizens (248e8–249a3). Th e unspoken implication seems to be that the 
 others are inadequately protected from injustice. Notice too that one is 
protected from suﬀ ering injustice, not from becoming unjust. Th e latter, 
a task for moral education, Socrates consistently argues is worse than the 
former. 77 Second, the city “takes on the role of father” to the orphaned 
children and assists in raising them (249a). Again, the implication is that 
the city does not normally do this, that is, it restricts such duties to the chil-
dren of the war dead. 78 When the orphans attain manhood, they are given 
the “instruments of their fathers’ aretē,” and, dressed in hoplite armor, they 
are oﬃ  cially recognized as full citizens and allowed to “rule their ancestral 
hearth with strength, decked out in arms” (249a6–b2). Th is metaphor assim-
ilates the family to an army, led by a citizen-warrior. Th is ritual transference 
took place during the Great or City Dionysia, an international festival that 
featured not only tragedy and comedy but also stark reminders of Athens’ 
imperial dominance. According to Isocrates, during this festival, the annual 
tribute to Athens was collected from the allies and ceremoniously brought 
onto the stage in front of a full theater ( de Pace 82). 79 Th e orphan ceremony 
cannot be divorced from this military context: it symbolized the continu-
ance and expansion of Athenian dominance. As the ﬁ nal component of 
state care, the city “never fails to honor the dead” through its yearly celebra-
tion of the funeral oration itself (249b3). 80 If my analysis of Socrates’ funeral 
oration as parodic is right, then its celebration can hardly count as genuine 
care. In fact, as the parody has been implying all along, the funeral oration 
is actually  harmful to the souls of the citizens. 
 Th e model of care that Socrates articulates in this section, contra 
Monoson, is hardly Platonic. By describing Athens as actually caring for its 
citizens adequately, Socrates’ parody exposes her as remiss while at the same 
time pointing toward an ideal in which the city actually would care for its 
citizens  in the relevant sense . Th e glaring omission in Socrates’ account is 
moral education or care for the soul. Surely, any genuinely Platonic account 
would feature care for the soul in a central role. Th e ﬁ nal component of 
state care, the funeral oration itself, surely does not accomplish such care. 
Quite the opposite: as I will presently argue, the parody reveals the funeral 
oration to be harmful in three main ways. 
 vi. plato’s ideal of political rhetoric 
 At the very end of the dialogue (249d–e), Socrates asks Menexenus if he is 
grateful to Aspasia for her speech. Th e young man claims that he is  grateful 
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for the speech—whoever composed it—and asks Socrates to continue to 
report such speeches to him. One wonders what Menexenus has taken from 
the speech. He does not seem transported to the Islands of the Blessed, 
but nor does he seem to get the critical point of Socrates’ parody. What 
exactly is he supposed to get? In what follows, I turn to the task of bringing 
together the criticisms and the implied ideals. In my view, the parodic criti-
cism shows that funeral oratory encourages self-ignorant complacency, an 
indiﬀ erence to truth, and the pursuit of false goods. A political rhetoric that 
genuinely cared for its audience would attempt to foster self-knowledge, an 
orientation toward the truth and the pursuit of genuine goods, like wisdom 
and virtue. Further, I try to show, albeit brieﬂ y, how both Socrates and the 
 Menexenus itself attempt to live up to these ideals. 
 Plato’s critique of the genre of epitaphios is part of his critique of 
“encomiastic discourse,” the discourse of praise in general (Nightingale 
1993). 81 Socrates claims that praising the dead and admonishing the  living 
to virtue are the central elements of the speech (236e), but, as his  acerbic 
remarks at the beginning of the dialogue show and as Pericles’  oration 
most clearly exempliﬁ es, the living in fact are praised for already having 
virtue rather than prodded into acquiring it. Th is is why Socrates feels 
“taller and nobler and more beautiful” after hearing a funeral oration. But 
insofar as the funeral oration praises its audience, it actually harms them. 
Th e  citizens listening to an orator praising them will be deceived about 
themselves. Indeed, when it is one’s own self-conception that is at stake, as 
Socrates points out, the bewitching and deceptive eﬀ ect of the praise has 
the greatest chance of  success. Th e self-knowledge of the Athenian citi-
zens is in greatest peril when they are praised. Made self-ignorant in this 
way, they become complacent and lazy—exactly how Socrates describes 
them in the  Apology (30e). While epitaphios seemingly desires to encour-
age virtue, its praise wholly undermines this task by causing self-ignorance. 
Th e  alternative ideal of political discourse would  actually encourage virtue 
by occasioning genuine self-knowledge; to do so, it must engage in criti-
cism. Indeed, both the rhetoric of Socrates, ironic praise, and that of Plato, 
parodic criticism, set up counterideals to the epitaphios’s praise-based 
model of political discourse in the  Menexenus itself. By revealing through 
criticism the deleterious eﬀ ects of praise, they both attempt to encourage 
self-knowledge in their respective audiences, in this case, Menexenus and 
Plato’s fourth-century Athenian readership. 
 Th e funeral oration’s lack of concern for truth is shown in the 
 indiscriminate praises it bestows on both the war dead and the audience 
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members (Coventry 1989, 8). Th e audience’s ensuing feeling of superiority 
rests on false premises with even further psychologically damaging eﬀ ects. 
Th e logic of the funeral oration requires that the city and the war dead be 
praised whether they deserve it or not (234c–235e). Th e rhetorical eﬀ ect of 
the speech, making its listeners feel good about themselves, depends on this 
distortion. Th e emphasis, as in democratic politics, falls on appearances, on 
how things seem—as long as the orator makes Athens seem praiseworthy, 
he has done his job well. Th is lack of concern for truth has a harmful eﬀ ect 
on the psychic health of the listening audience. Because the funeral oration 
prefers an attractive but false appearance, it fosters an indiﬀ erence to truth 
in the audience. By contrast, the ideal of political discourse would engender 
in its audience an orientation toward the truth. Socrates and Plato, through 
the critical exposure of the deceptive rhetoric of funeral oratory, attempt to 
instill such a concern for truth in their respective audiences. 
 As we have seen, funeral oratory in general and Pericles’ oration in par-
ticular encourage a militaristic conception of virtue and civic identity. Th is 
is because they are both indexed to the alleged good of military conquest. It 
is not so much the ﬁ gure of Pericles that is the concern of the parody but, 
rather, the gloriﬁ cation of aggressive imperialism in Athens’ civic ideal, to 
which Pericles gives the clearest expression. 82 Th e parodic oration’s silence 
on the matter of the ﬁ fth-century empire speaks volumes as a rejection of 
the imperialist ideal. Its insistence on Athens’ defensive posture distorts the 
history to absurdity and so implicitly suggests that aggressive military cam-
paigns are not praiseworthy and that wars can only be justly waged when 
made necessary by some outside force. Th is runs directly counter to Pericles’ 
insistence that the growth of the empire is the measure of a generation’s 
success (Th uc. 2.36). By creating a ﬁ ctional history that rejects not only 
the reality of the ﬁ fth-century empire but its ideal as well, Socrates rejects 
Pericles’ accomplishments both as a statesman and as an orator. Accord-
ing to the parodic critique, not only were Athens’ historical actions on the 
whole not praiseworthy, but her aspiration to a Periclean ideal of aggressive 
militarism was misguided as well. Th ose who listen to Pericles’ oration feel 
taller and more beautiful for all the wrong reasons. 
 By exposing the glory of military conquest as a false good, Plato’s dia-
logue implies that political discourse should attempt to orient its audience 
toward a genuine good, like wisdom or virtue. But neither wisdom nor 
virtue can be transmitted through the medium of funeral oratory, which 
dictates a determinate conception of virtue to a passive audience. Th e end 
of Socrates’ oration, by contrast, does not end the dialogue—Menexenus 
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is given an opportunity to respond, to think critically, and to engage in a 
philosophical discussion. So too does Plato’s  Menexenus invite its reader to 
respond critically and engage the issues philosophically. Th us, both Plato 
and Socrates attempt to motivate a philosophical examination into the 
nature of virtue. 
 vii. conclusion 
 Th e three interpretive diﬃ  culties I mention at the beginning can be resolved 
by understanding the rhetoric of parody in the  Menexenus . First, I show that 
the parody in the  Menexenus has serious philosophical implications, which 
are both critical and constructive. My interpretation of the  Menexenus 
 preserves its unity in that it accounts for both comic device and serious 
philosophical content, without splitting the dialogue up into a sequence of 
comic and serious parts. Second, I show that the parody has multiple and 
overlapping targets, including but not limited to Pericles’ funeral oration, 
and that the Aspasia reference need not have univocal signiﬁ cance. Finally, 
I show that the anachronism is a consequence of the parodic strategy of 
ampliﬁ cation to absurdity and that it is meant to draw our attention to the 
historical inaccuracies of the speech. 
 Th is approach to the dialogue not only provides a uniﬁ ed  interpretation 
of the dialogue that gives philosophical content to Plato’s use of parody but 
also potentially oﬀ ers a more general model for understanding the parody 
in other dialogues. As Plato employs it in the  Menexenus , parody takes a 
critical standpoint against its target, but it does not annihilate or subvert the 
target entirely. Rather, the criticisms aim at particular determinate features. 
In fact, Plato situates his particular criticisms in terms of implied counter-
ideals, which the genre and its exemplars fail to live up to. Furthermore, the 
target genre reﬂ ects the intentions and possibilities of the philosophical 
genre as well. Plato’s parodic criticism functions as a kind of inverse mirror 
for the genre of philosophy. By identifying the speciﬁ c features of a genre or 
text that Plato singles out for his parodic criticism, we can attempt to locate 
his ambitions for his own dialogues. Th e parody in the  Menexenus shows 
that Plato attempts to care for his audience: through criticism, he hopes to 
encourage them to pursue self-knowledge, to seek the truth, and to strive to 
be as virtuous as possible. 
 Marquette University 
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 notes 
 1. Clavaud’s survey of the literature divides the modern scholarship into “les partisans 
du sérieux” (1980, 45–48), “les conciliateurs” (1980, 48–66), and “les partisans du comique” 
(1980, 66–74). 
 2. Kahn argues that the  Mx. is a “kind of political pamphlet” (1963, 229), which “praises 
Athens as she should be praised” (1963, 224) and makes an appeal for Panhellenic unity 
(1963, 230). Ancient writers tended to take the oration seriously as well: see Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus ( Dem. 23–30). Cicero apparently claimed that Plato’s oration was read annu-
ally in Athens ( Orator 151). Kahn takes this as evidence of the seriousness of the funeral 
oration. However, even if we grant that “there is no reason to doubt” Cicero regarding the 
yearly recitation (Kahn 1963, 229), it is not obvious what exactly Cicero means here. Since 
the context is a discussion of the avoidance of hiatus, it is not clear  to whom the speech was 
delivered every year. If, for example, it was read in the Academy, then there is no reason 
to think it serious in Kahn’s sense. Further, the sentence itself has been suspected as the 
interpolation of an annotator who mistook the custom of delivering the speech annually 
for an annual recitation of the  Mx. : see Sandys 1885, 162–63. Huby (1957, 105–6) attempts, 
unsuccessfully in my view, to discredit this argument. Given my misgivings, contra Kahn, 
I do not take the annual recitation as one of the dialogue’s main puzzles. 
 3. Even Clavaud’s “conciliateurs” only manage to acknowledge both comic and  serious 
elements by splitting the dialogue and the funeral oration into serious parts and comic 
parts (1980, 48). 
 4. Aeschines, a minor Socratic, wrote a dialogue called “Aspasia”: see Clavaud 
1980, 253–58. On Antiphon as a target, see Clavaud 1980, 263–77. On Lysias as a target, 
see  Henderson 1975. 
 5. A fourth diﬃ  culty might have been added, but the authenticity of the dialogue, 
once in doubt, is no longer questioned: see Aristotle  Rhet. 1376b8, 1415b30. 
 6. Long (2003, 50) seems to think that the recognition of the comic elements in 
the dialogue amounts to a disavowal of the need for a uniﬁ ed interpretation of  Mx. Th is 
 inference is hardly justiﬁ ed—what follows is rather that a uniﬁ ed interpretation must take 
the comic elements into account. 
 7. Th e last claim is most crucial. Instead of dividing the dialogue into serious and 
comic parts, I propose to understand the serious point of the comedy. Cf. Salkever 1993, 
133–34. On the conceptual confusion often attending the failure to understand comedy as 
serious, see Silk (2000, 310–20), who has an extremely instructive discussion of the mean-
ing of the word  serious and the various equivocations that are prevalent in discussions 
of the seriousness of Aristophanic comedy. To summarize his position,  serious has three 
senses: (1) “solemn” as opposed to “humorous,” (2) “honest” as opposed to “pretending,” and 
(3) “substantial” as opposed to “trivial.” Comedy and tragedy can be serious in the third 
sense, even if only one is serious in the ﬁ rst. 
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 8. Th is characterization is intentionally broad. It has been historically diﬃ  cult to pin 
down what exactly counts as a case of parody: see Rose 1993. Even in antiquity, the word 
 par%di/a had multiple senses: see Householder 1944. 
 9. Henderson claims that the presence of multiple parodic targets makes the  Mx. a 
“pastiche” (1975, 33). Since a pastiche can be merely imitative or parodic, I retain  parody for 
clarity’s sake. 
 10. For other sorts of parodic distortion, see Rose 1993, 37–38. My analysis of the  Frogs 
passage relies on Silk 1993. 
 11. Th ere are several kinds of parodic inversion. For example, the literal understanding 
of an abstract concept is a kind of parodic inversion employed quite liberally in Aristo-
phanes’  Clouds . 
 12. All translations are my own. For the  Mx. , I have consulted Paul Ryan’s translation 
in Cooper 1997. 
 13. Silk (1993, 482, 486–87) notes that the ornate compound adjectives, simplex verbs, 
Doric alphas, verse vocabulary, and suppression of articles in this passage are literary 
 features typical of tragic lyric that are not speciﬁ c to Euripidean tragedy. 
 14. Cf. the following excerpts from Euripidean monody:  da/krusi da/krusin, wÅ do/moj 
wÅ do/moj ( Pho. 1500);  eãrin eãrin ta/lainan eãqeto ( Hel. 248);  oÁj eãteken eãteken ( Or.   987). In 
the Phrygian slave’s long frantic monody in  Orestes (1369–1502), there are no fewer than 
 eighteen such repetitions. 
 15. Some scholars see Aristophanes’ comedy as mere entertainment with no serious 
political intention: see, e.g., Heath 1987. For a clearheaded diagnosis and criticism of the 
tendency of modern scholars to impose an artiﬁ cial separation between art and politics in 
Aristophanes, see Henderson 1996, 65–69. 
 16. Th e debate in the literature on the  Mx. has been marred by the thought that 
the comic and the serious must be mutually exclusive. Kahn exempliﬁ es the speciousness 
of such reasoning: he argues that the speech cannot be parodic or satirical because “the 
intended eﬀ ect is not primarily comical” (1963, 226). On his account (1963, 229ﬀ .), the dia-
logue aims at a  serious attack on Athenian imperialism and an appeal for Panhellenic unity. 
To rephrase his argument: “If the  Menexenus is serious, it cannot be parody; it is serious; 
therefore it cannot be parody.” 
 17. Nightingale (1995) seems to think that parody, or at least Plato’s use of parody, 
involves a full repudiation of the targeted object. I will show that she is wrong about Plato 
and, a fortiori, about the larger claim. I do not want to deny that parody can involve a full 
repudiation. In fact, I think one only ﬁ nds it in the rarest of cases. Most cases, I submit, are 
what I call “complex.” Rose (1993, 45–47) shows how theories of the attitude of the parodist 
tend toward a false choice between the extremes of  contempt and  sympathy despite the fact 
that parodies often are both critical of and sympathetic to their targets. 
 18. Th is is signaled by making the cause of the tragic fuss turn out to be a chicken. 
Euripides himself had earlier exclaimed, “One ought not write about a chicken in tragedy” 
( Frogs 935). 
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 19. In Aristophanes’  Acharnians , Euripides is mocked precisely for putting beggars 
and cripples, i.e., “low” people, on the stage (384ﬀ .). 
 20. Another way to put this same point would be that parodic criticism can operate 
 dialectically (in the Hegelian sense): such parody criticizes but does not jettison its target. 
If parody is dialectical, then the target genre or text is partly preserved in the “higher unity” 
of the parodying text. By using the Hegelian notion of  Aufhebung , or determinate nega-
tion, as a paradigm for understanding the “negative” aspect of parody, we avoid an overly 
simplistic account of parody and avoid the unfortunate dilemma between understanding 
the negation as either annihilating or merely playful, i.e., as born out of either contempt 
for or sympathy with the target. See Hegel’s  Science of Logic (I.1.1.C.3 [106–8]). 
 21. Henderson (1996, 66n2) describes the didactic function of tragedy as an “assump-
tion” of the  Frogs . He also claims that the  Frogs conceives of “tragic poets as exemplifying 
and shaping the moral and civic character of their times” (2002, 5). 
 22. Cf. Arist.  Poet. chap. 15. Th e protagonist should be “good” ( Poet. 1454a17) but not 
“preeminent in virtue” ( Poet. 1453a8). 
 23. Indeed, in the  Grg. , Socrates describes most rhetoric as a species of ﬂ attery, of 
which epitaphios emerges here as a particularly egregious example. 
 24. In detailing the eﬀ ects of the speech on him, Socrates invokes motifs found 
 commonly in Aristophanic comedy’s portrayal of the eﬀ ect of praise on the Athenians 
both in the Assembly and the law courts. See, e.g.,  Ach. 1–204, 626–718. Loraux claims 
that “there is not a single element [of this playful praise] that Plato does not borrow 
from” Aristophanes’  Wasps : the exhaustive character of self-celebratory speeches (1986, 
636–37), the illusions of grandeur felt by the audience (1986, 637–38), the euphoric eﬀ ect 
caused by eloquence (1986, 641), and the imaginary voyage to the Islands of the Blessed 
(1986, 639–40). Loraux goes characteristically too far in saying that Plato “plagiarized” 
 Aristophanes (1986, 311). 
 25. Cf. Lysias 2.1. Ziolkowski (1981, 68–70), in his excellent work on the structure of 
the funeral oration, claims that mentioning the  diﬃ  culty of the task was a common way 
that funeral orators tried to gain the sympathy of their audience. Plato notably omits this 
commonplace. Kahn (1963, 231) sees Socrates’ comments here as indicating that the Lysias 
oration is also one of the parody’s targets. Henderson denies this, though he (1975, 30–33) 
does argue that Lysias is a target of the parody for other reasons. 
 26. See, e.g., Ar.  Ach. 520–30. 
 27. On the derogatory sense of  sugkolla/w and its comic origin, see Loraux 1986, 
469n282. 
 28. See Henderson 1975, 28. On the signiﬁ cance of Aspasia being a woman, see Loraux 
1986; Salkever 1993. 
 29. Aristophanes uses this strategy of attributing well-known Periclean actions to 
Aspasia in  Ach. , where Pericles is made to have started the Peloponnesian War essentially 
because of Aspasia. 
 30. Menexenus remains skeptical of Aspasia’s role even after the speech (249d–e). 
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 31. Th is anecdotal evidence is dubious at best, but Th ucydides does call Antiphon 
“one of the ablest Athenians of his time” who had a “powerful intellect” and gave “the best 
and most helpful advice,” and he judges Antiphon’s defense speech to be “the best one 
ever made up to [his] time” (8.68). On the stylistic similarities between Th ucydides and 
Antiphon, see Dionysius of Halicarnassus,  De compositione verborum 10, 22. See also Lamb 
1914, 178–83. 
 32. To refer to Spartans, Th ucydides uses “Peloponnesians” (257 times) far more 
often than other authors, though he uses “Lacadaimonians” (630) even more frequently. 
Cf. Xenophon and Isocrates, who both use “Peloponnesians” (twenty and seventeen 
times, respectively) infrequently and “Lacadaimonians” (484, 168) frequently. Plato uses 
“ Peloponnesians” three times in the  Lg. but nowhere else. In his oration, Socrates refers to 
the Lacadaimonians nine times and never to Peloponnesians. Th ese statistics are from a 
search of TLG-E. See Monoson 1998, 491–92. 
 33. He takes on the role of Strepsiades, the slow and aged student in Aristophanes’ 
 Clouds . On the “late learner,” see Diggle 2004, 477. Cf. Th eophr.  Char. 27. On the late 
learner in Plato, see Tarrant 1996. Cf.  Sph. 251b;  Rep. 409b. 
 34. My thanks go to Stephanie Nelson for pointing this out to me. On the chorus’ 
practice of stripping, see Sommerstein 1980, 188. Cf.  Ach. 627;  V. 408;  Pax 729–30;  Lys. 615, 
637;  Th esm. 656. 
 35. Th e solemn tone of the parodic funeral oration should not be wholly surprising, 
since the parody must substantially reproduce the tone of its target. Th at said, parody often 
does have a mocking or playful tone, which this one surely lacks. 
 36. Th e other extant orations are Lysias 2, Demosthenes 60, Hyperides 6, and a frag-
ment from Gorgias (preserved in Dionysius of Halicarnassus  Dem. 1). 
 37. Th e connection was recognized also in antiquity by Dionysius of Halicarnassus 
( Dem. 23). 
 38. For other alleged parallels, see Monoson 1998, 492–95. 
 39. See also Wickkiser 1999, 66–67. 
 40. Th e use of antithesis became widespread among Greek writers and orators, but 
its popularization is typically attributed to Gorgias. On the Gorgianic style of Socrates’ 
oration, see Coventry 1989, 7; Kahn 1963, 230; Wickkiser 1999, 67. On Th ucydides’ use of 
antithesis, see Lamb 1914, 183–89; Parry 1970. On the inﬂ uence of Gorgias on Th ucydides, 
see Lamb 1914, 149–63. 
 41. Th e word order, reproduced in my translation, sets “beautifully spoken words” in 
between “deeds bravely done” and “remembrance and honor,” thus emphasizing the medi-
ating role of words in honoring deeds. See Wickkiser 1999, 67. 
 42. By itself, the endorsement of the tradition would not recall Pericles, since such 
approval was a common feature of the prologue: see Ziolkowski 1981, 68–72. Th e seemingly 
conventional nature of Socrates’ opening should not mislead us. We know from the begin-
ning of the dialogue that he cannot possibly mean what he says here. See Clavaud 1980, 
110; Coventry 1989, 5. 
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 43. Cf. Lysias 2.18–19; Demosthenes 60.25–26. 
 44. On the connotations of the word  demokratia in the ﬁ fth and fourth centuries, 
see Sealey 1987. He argues that the Th uc. passage cited above shows the “deprecatory force” 
of the word (1987, 101–2), which Pericles wants to disclaim. On Pericles’ meaning in this 
passage, see also Gomme 1956, 107–9. 
 45. In conjunction with  Ap. 22a2–6, this point gains more force. In describing his 
search for a wise man, Socrates claims to have found that “those with the highest reputa-
tion were nearly the most deﬁ cient, while those who were thought to be inferior were more 
capable with respect to knowledge.” 
 46. As is clear from the  Grg. , Plato took a dim view of Pericles’ political stewardship 
(515dﬀ .). 
 47. In discussing this section, Kahn (1963, 225–26) argues that, since there is a serious 
protreptic intention, the passage cannot be parody. Th is is clearly fallacious, as my own 
interpretation will show that the parody does have protreptic intentions. Kahn glosses over 
the emphasis on seeming noted above and insists that the passage is an instance of “ten-
dentious protreptic” (1963, 226), though exactly what he means by this remains obscure. 
 48. I will omit discussion of the autochthony section in this article. On autochthony 
as a commonplace of the genre, see Ziolkowski 1981, 120–21.  On Athens as freedom ﬁ ght-
ers as a commonplace of the funeral oration, see Ziolkowski 1981, 106–8. For Athens as 
philanthropic in general, see Ziolkowski 1981, 102–10. In Lysias’s long historical section 
(2.3–66), he really emphasizes the notion of the Athenians as freedom ﬁ ghters, and he 
is likely a target of Plato’s in this section: see  Henderson 1975, 30–31, esp. 30n22. On the 
importance of the Persian War for Athenian orators, see Pownall 2004, 40–42. 
 49. For various accountings of the particular inaccuracies, see Clavaud 1980, 127–67; 
Henderson 1975, 39–45; Pownall 2004, 49–58; Shawyer 1906, xi–xv. 
 50. Because of these misrepresentations, epitaphioi are not considered reliable sources 
for fourth-century history. Since the orators were not historians, they were not bound by, 
e.g., the historical methodology that Th ucydides lays out for himself (1.20ﬀ .).  Worthington 
claims that, regarding historical information, “the orators lie, distort,  deliberately deceive, 
suppress the truth, and prevaricate as a matter of course. . . . [F]acts, persons and events 
were exploited, manipulated and even, if necessary, created to persuade the  audience” 
(1994, 109).  So I am in full agreement with Kahn’s (1963, 224–25) caution against tak-
ing every historical inaccuracy as evidence of parodic distortion. See also Pownall 
2004, 49–50. 
 51. Henderson describes the cumulative eﬀ ect thus: “Th e other orators may be wrong 
on details—even hopelessly so—but Plato excels all. . . . [N]one can rival him either in the 
number or degree of errors, omissions and distortions. Plato insists upon the righteous-
ness of the Athenians in the past, willfully distorting history to prove his point. Whatever 
stands in the way of this rosy picture is ruthlessly discarded” (1975, 40). Kahn calls it a 
“systematic distortion of Athenian history” (1963, 220). 
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 52. I agree with Coventry that it is implausible to view this section as a “noble lie” 
(1989, 9n33). 
 53. Coventry claims that the descriptions of Persia “could apply equally well to the 
Athenian empire” and that this parallel is being drawn intentionally as a subtle way of 
undercutting the omission of Athens’ empire (1989, 9–10). See also Pownall 2004, 55. 
 54. To take the last case for example, though it is true that the Leontini was an 
 Athenian ally, who appealed to Athens for assistance against Syracuse, and that the issue 
of Leontini comes up several times in Th uc. (3.86, 5.4, 6.6), Th ucydides himself clearly 
regards the motive of sending help to allies like Leontini as merely a pretext and the true 
aim of the Sicilian expedition to be control over the entire island of Sicily (6.6). 
 55. Th at Athens had an empire, properly speaking, is not considered controversial: for 
a classic exposition, see, e.g., Meiggs 1972. Th e character of that empire is a matter of some 
dispute. I am inclined to agreement with scholars who clearly face up to the ugly side of 
the Athenian Empire. See, e.g., Samons 2004. Th ucydides himself sometimes paints an 
appalling picture of Athens as an imperial power (e.g., 5.84–115) but sometimes seems 
to glorify it: on this, see de Ste Croix 1954. For a summary of views concerning Pericles’ 
responsibility for the imperial character of Athens, see Rhodes 2007. 
 56. Cf. Lysias 2.47, 55. 
 57. On this point, see Henderson 1975, 42–43, 42n72. 
 58. Lysias also makes disunity an explanation for defeat (2.65–66). 
 59. For example, he blames the Sicilian disaster on the length of the voyage, which 
prevented Athens from sending reinforcements. Never mind that they sent reinforcements 
twice—on Socrates’ account, because of the distance, they “gave in and were unlucky” 
(243a). See Th uc. 7.16, 7.42. On bad luck as a theme, see Henderson 1975, 42–43. 
 60. Contrast Lysias, who more elegantly acknowledges and slips past military defeat 
in his oration (2.58–59). 
 61. Both Kahn (1963, 227) and Rosenstock (1994, 338) overstate the importance of 
the anachronism, conceiving of it as the key to understanding the whole dialogue. I see 
no reason to generalize Plato’s use of this anachronism, as Pownall does: “Plato’s use of 
anachronism in the  Menexenus is similar to that of his other works, in that it functions as 
a reminder to the reader to look beneath the surface of the verbal sophistries contained in 
the oratorical tradition for the underlying moral truth” (2004, 59). 
 62. Kahn claims that in this passage, one ﬁ nds “the real meaning of the speech” (1963, 
226) and that it is a “truly Platonic funeral oration” (1963, 229). 
 63. Th e signiﬁ cance of this tone shift is typically assumed without argument, follow-
ing Kahn 1963, 229. 
 64. See Ziolkowski 1981, 138–40. Beginning with Kahn, commentators have also 
claimed to notice a “bitter” tone in the  Mx. Kahn (1963, 229–30) thinks that the narrative 
of the Corinthian War is the most bitter part of the speech but that the overall eﬀ ect is 
bitter as well. Coventry (1989, 14–15) ﬁ nds the exhortation to be particularly bitter but, like 
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Kahn, thinks the speech as a whole is bitter. Monoson (1998, 502) also notices a stinging 
tone, though decidedly not in the exhortation. I cannot see how either the exhortation or 
the praise section can be reasonably described as bitter, unless one is attributing complex 
parodic intentions to Plato. On the surface, no bitterness is apparent. As no textual evi-
dence is ever given to substantiate the “bitterness” claim, I will not endeavor to prove the 
negative. 
 65. Coventry also argues that the conception of virtue in  Mx. is not genuinely Socratic, 
but too much of her argument relies on  Ap. , and she does not provide a substantial analysis 
of the model of virtue provided in  Mx. except to claim that it is deﬁ cient “in its intellectual 
level” (1989, 14–15). 
 66. It is present in every section: see Ziolkowski 1981. In his oration, Pericles mentions 
 aretē twelve times; in the Platonic parody, there are fourteen instances; and in the funeral 
oration of Lysias, it occurs thirty-four times. 
 67. Th us, Coventry (1989, 14) is in error when she claims that the protreptic of the  Mx. 
is addressed only to children, as opposed to genuinely Socratic protreptic, which, following 
 Ap. 30a, is addressed to both young and old. Addressing the children and the parents of the 
dead was typical of this section: see Ziolkowski 1981, 154–16. 
 68. Cf. Lysias 2.77; Th uc. 2.44; Hyp. 6.42. 
 69. Coventry calls the moral sentiments expressed in the exhortation “bland conven-
tional moralizing” (1989, 14); however, she does not fully appreciate the military inﬂ ection 
that Socrates has given to virtue. 
 70. On this point, see Samons 2004, 187. 
 71. Th ough Pericles does advise a cessation to the expansion of the empire in order 
to win the Peloponnesian War (Th uc. 2.65), given what he says in the funeral oration 
about imperial expansion as the measure of a generation’s success (2.36), it seems clear 
that Pericles envisioned his strategy as a temporary measure to be jettisoned after the war 
was won. 
 72. None of this implies that courage is not a virtue or that citizens should refuse to 
serve when called upon by their city. Socrates’ own hoplite service, particularly in the retreat 
from Delium, seems to have been distinguished: see  Ap. 28e;  La. 181b;  Symp. 219e–221b. 
 73. Indeed, those who want to make the exhortation genuinely Platonic tend to make 
just this mistake, often by insisting that this part of the speech is diﬀ erent (in tone, inten-
tion, etc.) and can therefore be understood in isolation from the rest. Kahn, for example, 
refers to the “mixed tone” of the entire work (1963, 229). 
 74. Coventry describes Socrates’ elenchus as “more painful and more intellectually 
demanding” (1989, 14). 
 75. Other scholars have noticed the protreptic intention here but have insuﬃ  ciently 
appreciated the role of the parody in executing it: see Coventry 1989, 2; Kahn 1963, 225–26. 
 76. Monoson claims that, in this passage,  Mx. “appears to make sincere use of this 
form of discourse and this public occasion”; she relies on the change in tone argument 
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(see note 73 above) and claims that, from 246a forward, one ﬁ nds “more straightforward 
and apparently heartfelt argument” (1998, 502). I think Monoson is right to think that 
Pericles’ oration is one of the targets here, though perhaps not for the reasons she thinks. 
Among our extant funeral orations, only Pericles’ elaborates on the relationship between 
city and citizen to the same degree (Th uc. 2.43). Th us, it is plausible that Plato has that 
section in mind. Attention to the greatness of Athens, Pericles argues, should make the 
citizens  lovers  (e)rasta\j ) of Athens and its power (Th uc. 2.43.1). Th is erotic model of citi-
zenship is tied to a militaristic conception of virtue. Monoson (1998, 495–97), in my view, 
relies too heavily on Plato’s  Lysis to make her case. She (1998, 511n27) mentions but does not 
emphasize the stronger evidence of the politician as lover in the  Grg. Recall that  Callicles 
is described as having two lovers, both of whom are called “Demos” ( Grg. 482c–e). 
 77. See especially the Grg. , in which nearly the entire discussion with Polus and  Callicles 
is dedicated to the defense of the preferability of suﬀ ering to committing injustice. 
 78. Th ough I do not agree with Huby’s (1957) argument that the  Mx. is intended as a 
political pamphlet on behalf of war orphans, if she is right that Athens was neglecting, or 
considering neglecting, her duties in taking care of the families of the war dead, then the 
parodic point here gains more force. 
 79. Th ere is some dispute as to whether the text indicates that the whole of the tribute 
or the surplus of the tribute was carried onstage: see Raubitschek 1941, 359–60. For the 
relation of the festival as a whole to Athenian political ideology, see Goldhill 1987. 
 80. For evidence regarding the frequency of the public funeral ceremony, 
see Ziolkowski 1981, 22–23. Socrates mentions athletic and poetic contests in addition. 
Th ough I will not pursue the point here, the purpose of these contests, in this context, was 
arguably to promote military readiness and to celebrate military deeds, respectively. 
 81. See also Loraux 1974, 173–77; Nightingale 1995. Ziolkowski (1981, 132–37) identiﬁ es 
thirty-nine commonplaces of praise in the funeral oration. 
 82. Pericles, in a diﬀ erent speech, describes the Athenian Empire as a “tyranny” but 
quickly brushes aside any moral misgivings (Th uc. 2.63). He asserts that Athens will be 
remembered eternally for the greatness of her power: for “having spent more lives and 
work on warfare than any other city” and for “having ruled over more Greeks than anyone 
else” (2.64). 
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